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DUNHAM

SOCIAL TRUTHS IN THE WORKPLACE: HOW
ADVERSARIALISM UNDERMINES DISCRIMINATION
LITIGATION
CATHERINE ROSS DUNHAM*
INTRODUCTION
This Article explores the effectiveness of dispute resolution for
gender discrimination claims in the American system of civil litigation.
Adversarialism is a defining feature of the American system of civil
justice, beginning with reduced trust in the quasi-inquisitorial system of
Chancery in the nineteenth century and escalating with the increased
importance of lawyers and public trials in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries.1 Although adversarialism remains of great importance in
some aspects of the American system, this Article questions whether the
adversarial system is the best system to address workplace-based
discrimination claims, as those claims are intimately connected to
changes in social and cultural understandings within the workplace and
American society overall.
The tenets of our system over-rely on the assumption of a shared
social context to define social truth.2 But that assumption is flawed in
workplace discrimination litigation as workplace context varies by
profession, and the worker experience varies based on the individual’s
position in the hierarchy.3 For example, a male supervisor may see the
workplace culture as fair and merit-based, whereas his female
contemporary may view the workplace culture as competitive and
closed, seeing her position as that of an outsider who had to navigate
her career path carefully.4 These varying perspectives create different
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would like to thank Alexis Gadzinski, J.D. Class of 2021 and Lisa Watson, J.D., M.L.S for
research assistance and Dr. Taleed El-Sabawi for thoughts and input offered in the process of
research and writing.
1 See AMALIA D. KESSLER, INVENTING AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN
ADVERSARIAL LEGAL CULTURE, 1800-1877, at 4-14 (2017).
2 See MATS ALVESSON & KAJ SKÖLDBERG, REFLEXIVE METHODOLOGY 23 (3d ed. 2018)
(discussing the philosophy of social constructionism).
3 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231 (1989).
4 See, e.g., id. at 233 (involving a claim where of the of the eighty-eight persons proposed for
partnership at Price Waterhouse, only one was a woman).
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social truths in the workplace, which are challenged by litigation.5 When
the female employee claims that she was discriminated against in an
unfair workplace, her social truth is thrust against the social truth of
other supervisors and managers who view the workplace as fair.
Litigation places those two conflicting understandings of workplace
culture into direct controversy.6 It positions the relevant parties as
adversaries not only on the legal issues but also on the issue of what is
true about the workplace culture, reducing the opportunity for
meaningful cultural change within and without the workplace.7
This Article asks what type of dispute resolution system can
create a more reliable assessment of workplace social truth. By
exploring options such as the quasi-inquisitorial systems of American
Chancery and European conciliation,8 as well as the role of the
Arbitrator and Magistrate in American civil litigation,9 the Article
suggests that a non-adversarial approach allows for a more holistic
resolution of workplace controversies. If a judicial officer who can
approach the conflict from a place of conciliation oversees the conflict
cognizant of the relevant community and social context, resolution
options can offer relief to the plaintiff within the subject workplace and
protect the relevant economic and cultural interests of the defendant.
Conflict resolution, which attempts to understand the competing social
truths of the workplace, can offer an opportunity for voluntary change
in the workplace without placing parties fully at risk as they are in the
“winner-take-all” litigation scenario.10 Furthermore, as our social truths
evolve and change, our dispute resolution system, which de facto
manages those truths through adversarial litigation, should be
reconsidered for its role in creating new truths about whether the
workplace is fair to all.11

5 See infra Part I; see also Kenneth R. Berman, Is an Adversarial Legal System Well Suited for
Delivering Justice?, 47 LITIGATION 1, 1-3 (2020).
6 Berman, supra note 5, at 1 (“In an adversarial system, the search for truth is a battle of
narratives.”).
7 Id.
8 See KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 6, 14; see also infra Part
III.
9 See infra Part III.
10 Majorie A. Silver, Fairness and Finality: Third-Party Challenges to Employment
Discrimination Consent Decrees After the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 321, 327,
327 n.52 (1993).
11 See Natasha J. Silber, Unscrambling the Egg: Social Constructionism and the Antireification
Principle in Constitutional Law, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1873, 1881-82 (2013) (discussing how
gender is socially constructed and subject to change).
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This Article proceeds as follows: Part I of this Article explores
the concept of social truths and the importance of social truths in the
workplace itself and litigation surrounding the workplace through the
lens of gender discrimination litigation.12 Part II of this Article explores
the history and roots of American adversarialism, examining why
adversarialism became the hallmark of the American system of civil
dispute resolution, and asking whether the reasons which prompted the
ascension of American adversarialism apply today in litigation.13
Finally, Part III of this Article explores other systems of dispute
resolution. It suggests that a quasi-inquisitorial approach to workplace
discrimination litigation allows for more meaningful outcomes in
individual litigation and also allows for overall social change in the
workplace.14
I.

SOCIAL TRUTHS AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION

In gender discrimination cases, the plaintiff contends that an
employer acted in a way that discriminated against persons based on
their sex.15 The crux of the contention is that the workplace is not fair—
some employees are not treated the same as others, thus not afforded the
same safe work environment and/or opportunities for advancement.16
Although most gender discrimination lawsuits target entities as
employers, the nature of a discrimination lawsuit is personal. Gender
discrimination lawsuits assert that the defendant, through its people and
practices, broke social and legal norms by allowing a workplace to
operate unfairly.17 If this allegation is postured through a lawsuit, the
assertion of unfairness must be addressed in the language of adversity.18
Allegations are made and answered, law is argued, economic ground is
protected, and reputations are at risk.19 The defendant worries about the
impact of the lawsuit on big picture issues like consumer response,

12

See infra Part I.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; see infra Part III.
14 See infra Part III.
15 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2; see also Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989)
(“The plaintiff must show that the employer actually relied on her gender in making its
decision.”); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 626 (1987) (discussing the plaintiff’s
ultimate burden in a Title VII case).
16 See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228; Johnson, 480 U.S. 616; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,
564 U.S. 338 (2011).
17
See generally Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228; Johnson, 480 U.S. 616; Dukes, 564 U.S. 338.
18 See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 26-37 (prescribing the rules for discovery in civil litigation and
exemplifying the adversarial nature of the system).
19 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8
13
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revenues, and share prices.20 Plaintiffs worry about possessing the
necessary resources to pursue their claim, as well as the personal and
professional costs attendant to gender discrimination litigation.21 In
terms of risk, everyone is “all in” after the lawsuit is filed.22
However, discrimination plaintiffs seek more than monetary
23
relief. Plaintiffs seek validation of their own experience and a change
of culture in the workplace.24 The non-monetary remedial theory is that
if the employer can accept that certain actions and policies lead to
discriminatory results, the workplace changes across the board and
many benefit.25 However, in the adversarial system of civil justice, the
defendant has too much at stake to pursue options that address this
remedial theory.26 The defendant also has no incentive to operate
outside of a legal action as it relies on the court system to discern which
claims are valid and which are frivolous.27 When the parties are forced
into the vortex of the adversarial system, they miss the opportunity to
confront their own social truths about which behaviors beget better
workplace culture and productivity.28 There is simply too much at stake
to address the issues with a growth mindset. The defendant employer
must then occupy the position of denying the plaintiff’s allegations or
risk excess exposure.29 Thus, the social truth of the workplace, that all
is fair, must be protected to benefit all.
20

See generally Dukes, 564 U.S. 338.
Id.
22 See Berman, supra note 5, at 1 (“When the legal system delivers the wrong result, money,
property, liberty and life can be lost and society will suffer.”).
23 See e.g., id.; Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Johnson v. Transp. Agency,
480 U.S. 616 (1987) (demonstrating that the female plaintiff sought a change to workplace
policy which would benefit other female employees, e.g., Anne Hopkins sought recognition of
the impact gender had on partner evaluations).
24 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228; Johnson, 480 U.S. 616; Dukes, 564 U.S. 338.
25 See Robert Charles Johnson, Comment, Partnership and Title VII Remedies: Price
Waterhouse Cracks the Glass Ceiling, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 787, 787 (1991) (discussing the
equitable remedies available in Title VII litigation).
26 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8. Civil litigation has become more “front-loaded,” focused on the early
pleading stages of litigation, in part because defendants have become more attuned to the
litigation risks which, in employment discrimination cases, involve financial risks and risks to
the defendant’s public reputation. Id.
27 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
28 See Berman, supra note 5, at 1 (“In an adversarial system, the search for truth is a battle of
narratives . . . Generally our adversary system favors the better story, not necessarily the truer
one . . . . Fact finders believe the story they want to believe, the one that’s easier to imagine.
That becomes their truth. If they don’t feel good about some other story, they won’t believe it,
even if it’s the actual truth.”).
29 See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(b)(6) (“An allegation—other than one relating to the amount of
damages—is admitted if a responsive pleading is required and the allegation is not denied.”).
21
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A. Creating Workplace Social Truths
This Article asks whether the civil system of justice, which relies
on adversarialism, is effective when a workplace “social truth” is at
issue. To explore that question further, we must consider what is meant
by the term “social truth,” a term developed in this Article. The term is
based in the theory of social constructionism, which has been used to
explain how individual and institutional traits are developed through a
social context.30
Courts have used social constructionist arguments to explore
meanings of race and sexuality.31 Generally, an argument that relies on
social constructionism argues that society, not biology, creates the
categories that cause us to differentiate between different types of
people.32 Social constructionism is juxtaposed with essentialism, which
argues that human identity categories are fixed and exist
“transhistorically and transculturally.”33
The pioneers of social constructionist theory were Peter Berger
and Thomas Luckmann.34 Berger and Luckmann argued that we socially
construct our realities through a process which begins with typification,
wherein we “typify” others in various ways; for example, as white,
male, and young, based principally on face-to-face interactions.35 These
typifications give rise to “objectivations,” wherein the content gained
from face-to-face interactions is given a more material expression
primarily through language.36 This process builds the “social stock of
ALVESSON & SKÖLDBERG, supra note 2, at 15 (“Social constructionism has increasingly
emerged as an important perspective within social science and has even become predominant in
some areas. Generally it can be said that for social constructionism, in contrast to positivism,
reality is precisely socially constructed . . . The important thing for research therefore becomes
to explore how these social constructions happen. This approach is not particularly theoryoriented; the focus is rather on the ‘disclosure’ of how social phenomena are socially
constructed. As we shall see, social constructionism is very rich and multi-faceted, so what has
been said thus far is only a first indication of direction.”).
31 See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); cf. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S.
558 (2003) (discussing theories which posit that gender and race can be evaluated as social
constructs rather than as identities relegated to biology alone).
32 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Social Justice Movements and LatCrit Community: On Making
Anti-Essentialist and Social Constructionist Arguments in Court, 81 OR. L. REV. 629, 633
(2002) (“[C]ourts have, in some instances, explicitly accepted the concept that society, not
biology or nature, creates the categories that lead us to distinguish between ‘types’ of people.”).
33 Id. at 634.
34 ALVESSON & SKÖLDBERG, supra note 2, at 24; see also PETER L. BERGER & THOMAS
LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF
KNOWLEDGE (1966).
35 ALVESSON & SKÖLDBERG, supra note 2, at 25.
36 Id. at 26 (“Signs, symbols and language are examples of such objectivations.”).
30

DUNHAM

2022]

SOCIAL TRUTHS IN THE WORKPLACE

45

knowledge” that humans use to achieve social order, as is needed for
stability.37 Social constructionist theory further argues that the social
order of human life is ongoing and changing and does not possess some
inherent nature.38 “People alienate, or externalize, themselves by
necessity in their actions and the social order is an expression of this.”39
Notably, the process of developing a social order creates
institutions.40 Socially constructed institutions are built on human
habitualizations:
We create within our social relations all the time new
habits and routines in our actions, as well as new
categories in our observing of others and their actions.
Or in Berger and Luckmann’s terminology, we
habitualize and typify; these habitualizations and
typifications – these habits, routines, and categorizations
– spread between actors, and as they do this, institutions,
that is fixed patterns of thought and action, emerge:
institutionalization occurs, for instance in the shape of
family, religion, legal systems, sports, school systems,
health care, hunting, etc.41
These institutions then become something understood as
external to the creators themselves, and an “institutional logic” is
created to explain the core values and structures of the institution and
serve as the basis for the institution’s legitimacy.42 Bergen and Luckman
noted that “bod[ies] of knowledge as a whole” are developed through
this process of institutionalization and legitimacy, and that knowledge
37

Id. (quoting BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 34, at 56).
Id. (quoting BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 34, at 69-70) (“The social order is thus a
human product, or more specifically ‘an ongoing human product’; it is not something inherent
in the ‘nature of things’, nor does it express any ‘natural law.’”).
39 Id.
40
Id.
41 Id. (quoting BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 34, at 78) (“In every institution, actions of a
certain type are supposed to be carried out by a certain type of actor. For example, our legal
system as an institution stipulates certain penalties for individuals above a certain age who are
aware of the consequences of their actions and commit certain crimes. Academic institutions
stipulate certain rules of admittance for certain types of actors (students) and conditions of
employment for others (researchers, teachers, administrators). And so forth.”).
42 Id. at 27 (quoting BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 34, at 83-84). Berger and Luckmann
discuss this process as creating an institutional biography—a narrative understanding of what
constitutes the story of the institution. Id. This biography then allows the institution to define its
membership. Id.
38
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is then used to define the institution itself and all those within.43 The
knowledge is then transmitted not only by the persons within the
institution but also between generations, thus forming a defining “truth”
of the institution.44 This truth becomes “sedimented” when institutional
knowledge is transferred between people, especially when passed
between people with special typifications, such as student to teacher or
employer to employee.45 Under social constructionism, “there is no
Truth, only local truths.”46 Therefore, the institution’s idea about what
constitutes a truth within its membership is not based on some
overriding law or social order.47 The truth of each institution was created
within itself and serves as the basis for institutional legitimacy for all
those within the institution.48
Social constructionism, as it relates to gender, focuses its
attention to “‘how the identity category itself is formed.’”49
Constructionists argue that identity categories are “social creations” that
“result from social belief and practice, are themselves complex social
practices, and may be evaluated in terms of whose interests they
serve.”50 Social constructionists take the position that the category
“woman” is given meaning by societies rather than by an external
“natural” force.51 In contrast, essentialist theories deny society’s role in
defining a trait and discount the variations between individual’s bearing
that trait.52 Essentialist thinking is, in some ways, easier for courts to
embrace as the theory relies on fixed realities.53 In the context of gender,
43 See BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 34, at 83-84. The authors use the term “sedimented”
to describe the way experience and knowledge is stored in memory layers within and between
individuals and the role of knowledge in allowing for the transfer of institutional knowledge and
collective sedimentation. Id. at 85.
44 See ALVESSON & SKÖLDBERG, supra note 2, at 30 (describing Gergen’s position that
institutional knowledge is “never abstract, objective and absolute but always concrete, situated
and tied to human practice”); see also KENNETH J. GERGEN, AN INVITATION TO SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION (Luke Block ed., 3d ed. 2015).
45 See ALVESSON & SKÖLDBERG, supra note 2, at 27.
46 Id. at 30.
47 See id. at 28.
48 Id. (“Legitimization constitutes another layer in the objectivation of meaning. It integrates
disparate meanings to a connected whole. This takes place both at the level of the single
individual’s biography and at the level of institutions. Legitimization becomes necessary when
meaning is to be mediated to new generations for which it is no longer self-evident. Explanations
and justifications therefore become possible, and this is the process of legitimization.”).
49 Goldberg, supra note 32, at 634.
50 Daniel R. Ortiz, Creating Controversy: Essentialism and Constructivism and the Politics of
Gay Identity, 79 VA. L. REV. 1833, 1836 (1993); see Silber, supra note 11, at 1891 (noting that
the Supreme Court recognizes ways in which gender is socially constructed).
51 Goldberg, supra note 32, at 633-34.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 635-36 n.22-23.
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men are defined by male reproductive systems, and women are defined
by female reproductive systems.54 In gender discrimination cases, the
determination of whether the plaintiff possesses the trait, or traits, the
law requires to substantiate the claim does not involve a complex
evaluation of social context as might be involved with determinations
of ethnicity or race.55
How a court views its role in determining a discrimination claim
is crucial to its ability to evaluate the claim and allow a remedy. 56 To
prevail in a discrimination claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate that he or
she has the protected trait, such that he or she is a member of a protected
class, and that he or she suffered discriminated based on that trait.57 The
determination of whether the plaintiff possesses the protected trait is
more complex when the theory behind that determination relies on a
social construction of what it means to be of a certain race or gender.58
Courts have allowed for social construction theory in cases evaluating
discrimination based on race or ethnicity, generally accepting the
argument that race, and what it means to be part of a given race, is
socially constructed.59 However, courts have been reluctant to apply
social constructionism to determinations regarding gender.60 Rather,
courts have defaulted to the physical differences between men and
women when determining if the plaintiff belongs to a protected class.61
This approach to gender belies the complexity of gender and the role of
society in creating the operative truths around gender and, more

See Silber, supra note 11, at 1896-97 (“Not only does the Court acknowledge ‘real’
difference, thereby ensuring that gender will continue as a meaningful social category, it also
imbues attributes to women and men that go beyond the biological differences that are used to
justify this set of legal classifications.”); see also Robin Dembroff, Issa Kohler-Hausmann &
Elise Sugarman, What Taylor Swift and Beyoncé Teach Us About Sex and Causes, 169 U. PA.
L. REV. ONLINE 1, 6 (2020).
55 See Silber, supra note 11, at 1891 (“In contrast to its jurisprudence on race, the Court has
steadfastly maintained that gender difference is real, enduring, and even worthy of
celebration.”).
56 See Goldberg, supra note 32, at 636, 659 (“To the extent that legal arguments disturb a
court’s sense that a fixed group shares the particular trait at issue, however, the plaintiff may
leave court with an intact identity but no court-ordered remedy.”).
57 See id. at 636-37.
58 See id. at 642.
59 See ALVESSON & SKÖLDBERG, supra note 2, at 15.
60 See Tracy A. Thomas, Leveling Down Gender Equality, 42 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 177, 18586 (2019); Dembroff et al., supra note 54, at 5-6, 6 n.21.
61 See generally Dembroff et al., supra note 54, at 3 (discussing sex discrimination in terms
of “sex features” that refer exclusively to physical features that are associated with male and
female reproductive roles).
54

DUNHAM

48

U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS

[VOL. 22:1

specifically, the effect of gender in a given institutional context—a
workplace.62
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins63 supplies a notable example of
how gender discrimination involves a more nuanced trait analysis that
one based solely on physical difference, and how institutionalization
impacts the nature of the discrimination based on gender traits. In Price
Waterhouse, the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, asserted a claim for Title VII
gender discrimination, arguing that she was not selected for partnership
due to her female gender.64 More specifically, Hopkins argued that the
partners’ expectations of female behavior, when combined with the
firm’s institutional culture, placed her in a double-bind wherein she was
expected to exhibit feminine traits, yet also expected to work in a
manner consistent with the male partners who valued masculinity.65
However, when Hopkins cursed, she was not feminine enough.66
Hopkins was refused a partnership for a lack of “interpersonal skills”67
after nineteen of the thirty-two partners who submitted comments on
Hopkins failed to support her bid for partnership.68 Hopkins’ successful
lawsuit relied on evidence of sex-stereotyping in her Title VII case,
arguing that the Price Waterhouse male-dominated culture caused the
partners to evaluate Hopkins, and other women, in gender-based terms
flowing from “an impermissibly cabined view of the proper behavior of
women . . . .”69

See id. at 4 (“An allegation of discrimination under Title VII demands a social explanation.”).
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
64 Id. at 231-32. Supervising partners advised that “Hopkins should ‘walk more femininely, talk
more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear
jewelry.’” Id. at 235.
65 Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1116 (1985); Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S.
at 235 (“There were clear signs, though, that some of the partners reacted negatively to Hopkins’
personality because she was a woman. One partner described her as “macho” . . . ; another
suggested that she ‘overcompensated for being a woman’ . . . ; a third advised her to take ‘a
course at charm school . . .’”).
66 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235 (“Several partners criticized her use of profanity; in
response, one partner suggested that those partners objected to her swearing only ‘because it’s
a lady using foul language.’”).
67 Id. at 234-35.
68 Id. at 233. At the time of Hopkins’ partnership application, Price Waterhouse consisted of
662 partners, including only 7 women firm-wide. Id. Hopkins was the only woman, of the 88
total persons, proposed for partnership that year. Id. Forty-seven candidates were admitted for
partnership; 21 candidates were denied; and 20 candidates were held for reconsideration,
including Hopkins. Id.
69 Id. at 236-37; see also Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1116-17, 1120
(1985).
62
63
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Ann Hopkins’ double-bind70 illustrates two aspects of this
discussion. First, the determination of whether she was in a protected
class for purposes of her Title VII claim was not an issue—she was
physically female, so her membership in a protected class was not in
question.71 However, her female traits, or lack thereof, were the center
of her discrimination claim.72 The male partners’ reaction to her
seemingly masculine presentation constituted pretextual discrimination
based on sex.73 The issue for Hopkins, in many ways, was not her actual
physical gender, but how the Price Waterhouse institution socially
constructed her gender.74 Furthermore, the defendant institution had
functioned as an institution in creating its own institutional logic, or
“biography,” of what it meant to be a partner in the firm.75 Hopkins
disrupted this biography and thus disrupted the social truth of the
defendant’s firm leading to a determination that she did not fit.76
Hopkins’ discriminatory treatment evolved not specifically from her
physical gender, but from the social truth of the Price Waterhouse
workplace. Further, Hopkins’ gender discrimination lawsuit challenged
the Price Waterhouse institutional logic that the workplace was fair.77
In reality, the workplace was only fair to those who fit the institution’s,
the firm’s, logic.
70

See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 234-35; see also GILLIAN THOMAS, BECAUSE OF SEX: ONE
LAW, TEN CASES AND FIFTY YEARS THAT CHANGED AMERICAN WOMEN’S LIVES AT WORK 201
(2016) (citing Deborah L. Brake, When Equality Leaves Everyone Worse Off: The Problem of
Leveling Down in Equality Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 513, 516, 516 n.6 (2004)).
71 See Silber, supra note 11, at 1896, 1896 n.138 (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S.
515, 533 (1996) (explaining that the “[p]hysical differences between men and women . . . are
enduring . . . .”).
72 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 235.
73 See id. Note that the Court’s decision that sex-stereotyping can constitute Title VII gender
discrimination allows, on its face, for a similar discrimination claim brought by a similarly
situated employee who was male in terms of physical gender assignment but possessed female
behavioral traits or a lack of male behavioral traits. For example, if a male employee was
stereotyped as less masculine because he exhibited some stereotypically feminine behavior and
that stereotyping led to an adverse employment action, the male employee’s claim would be
supported by the Court’s reasoning in Price Waterhouse. Id. at 248.
74 See id. at 235. Price Waterhouse was a male-dominated institution, which allowed
stereotyped thinking to inform its opinion as to professional skill and success based on gender.
Id. at 233. The negative partner reviews of Hopkins were not reporting on her gender. Id. at 235.
Rather, partners who made negative comments about Hopkins based on gendered expectations
of her interpersonal skills telegraphed to others within the firm that Hopkins did not meet the
institution’s culture. Id at 234-35.
75 See id. at 235.
76 See id.
77 See Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp 1109, 1111-13 (D.D.C. 1985) (noting the
court’s background discussion of Price Waterhouse’s extensive partnership application process
with a focus on neutrality).
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B. Evaluating the Role of Litigation in Disrupting Workplace
Social Truths
Although Ann Hopkins ultimately prevailed in her lawsuit and
was awarded a partnership after appellate success on her claim, she
remained an outsider.78 Her success, such as it was, was not
comprehensive, perhaps because her legal remedy did not address the
workplace culture, and she would have to remain in that culture to fully
achieve her legal remedy.79 But the Court was not in a position to assess
why Price Waterhouse had discriminated against Hopkins, only that it
had and that the discrimination was unlawful under Title VII.80 Indeed,
it would be outside the role of the trial or appellate courts to examine
the social truth of this defendant’s, or any defendant’s, organization.81
Discrimination litigation is not designed to engage in the type of
“reflexive dialogue” needed to manage the “hardened taken-for-granted
assumptions” of social institutions—their social truths.82
When discrimination plaintiffs seek a legal remedy for an unfair
workplace, they are moving from one institution, with its social truths,
to another.83 Women in employment discrimination cases are
transferring control of their cases from one set of authority figures,
employers, to another, judges.84 Given that supervisors and judges are
predominantly male, women plaintiffs struggle to convince a new, but

78

See THOMAS, BECAUSE OF SEX, supra note 70, at 146-47.
See generally Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202 (D.D.C. 1990) (finding, on
remand, that Hopkins was entitled to back pay, with reductions for failure to mitigate, and that
Hopkins was entitled to be made a partner); see also THOMAS, BECAUSE OF SEX, supra note 70,
at 146-47 (discussing Hopkins’ return to Price Waterhouse after her successful lawsuit and her
exit from the firm thereafter).
80 Goldberg, supra note 32, at 636-37 (noting that in evaluating a gender discrimination claim,
the court must determine whether the plaintiff has demonstrated she possesses the trait protected
by legislation and that she has been targeted for discrimination based on that trait).
81 See id. at 642-43 (stating that social constructionist analysis “marks the beginning of
uncomfortable territory for most courts. An anti-discrimination claim based on a trait
acknowledged to be socially constructed calls not only for a judge to weigh the evidence of
discrimination, which resonates as a judge-like activity, but also to engage in the
sociological/anthropological enterprise of determining the indicia, or even the very existence,
of a particular identity trait.”).
82 See ALVESSON & SKÖLDBERG, supra note 2, at 31; see also Goldberg, supra note 32, at 659
(“To the extent that legal arguments disturb a court’s sense that a fixed group shares the
particular trait at issue, however, the plaintiff may leave court with an intact identity but no
court-ordered remedy.”).
83 DEBORAH L. RHODE, THE BEAUTY BIAS: THE INJUSTICE OF APPEARANCE IN LIFE AND LAW 111
(2010) (citation omitted).
84 Id.
79
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perhaps very similar, demographic of their discriminatory experience,
which is often based on the social truth of the employing institution.85
The paradox for a discrimination plaintiff lies at the intersection
of our legal system of dispute resolution, which is housed in our civil
courts, and the complex social explanation of what happened to that
plaintiff in that workplace.86 Title VII litigation is jurisdictionally
relegated to the federal courts, so it relies on the adversarial constructs
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence. Furthermore,
discrimination litigation is designed to tell the parties whether wrongful
discrimination occurred.87 Courts reviewing discrimination litigation
are not equipped to offer a social explanation for what occurred, yet a
plaintiff’s claims cannot be fully resolved without a social
explanation.88
Turning back to social constructionism, courts have engaged
social constructionist theories in evaluating discrimination cases based
on race and ethnicity,89 but have been reluctant to apply those theories
to gender.90 In fact, courts have embraced the inherent gender
differences between men and women, treating gender differences as real
rather than socially constructed.91 By approaching gender as an essential
trait based on physical reproductive traits, the courts have
simultaneously improved women’s workplace equity while diminishing
gender as an important social category.92

85 See id. at 140; see also Biographical Directory of Article III Federal Judges, 1789-present:
Advanced
Search
Criteria,
FED.
JUD.
CTR.,
https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/search/advanced-search (last visited Feb. 2022).
86 See Dembroff et al., supra note 54, at 4.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 8-9 (“For example, when the Supreme Court recognized in Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins that firing a woman for being ‘overly aggressive’ could be an instance of sex
discrimination, it is precisely because they recognized that the explanation for the firing was not
merely due to that individual’s sex features, much less merely due to her being ‘overly
aggressive.’ What makes the act discriminatory is the relevance of acting on the basis of her
being ‘overly aggressive’ in light of the social meanings of female sex—particularly, the norm
that females ought not to be aggressive.”).
89 See Silber, supra note 11, at 1891 (describing the use of social constructionism on cases
based on race like Brown v. Board of Education).
90 Id. (“In contrast to its jurisprudence on race, the Court has steadfastly maintained that gender
difference is real, enduring, and even worthy of celebration. While the Court does recognize
ways in which gender is socially constructed, it has never attempted to eliminate gender from
popular consciousness as the antireification principle would require. Instead, it has sought only
to eradicate certain constructs—or ‘stereotypes’—that it regards as false or archaic.”).
91 Id. at 1897-98.
92 Id.; see generally THOMAS, Leveling Down Gender Equality, supra note 60.
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AMERICAN ADVERSARIALISM AND WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION

It is shortsighted to view the courts’ response to gender as a
refusal to accept the social nature of gender. Often courts are faced with
the difficult decision of how to resolve the case.93 They could resolve
the case in a way that affects structural change, even at the expense of
the individual’s remedy, or to address the individual plaintiff’s remedy
exclusively, even at the expense of creating precedent that further
advances discrimination law for other plaintiffs.94 This complexity
flows from the nature of our adversarial system for resolving workplace
issues through litigation rather than through a system of conciliation.95
Discrimination plaintiffs, and their lawyers, face a complex dynamic
wherein they must vigorously seek the individual plaintiff’s remedy
while also attempting to shift judicial thinking about the law or the
plaintiff’s particular social group.96 Defendants must attack the
plaintiff’s claims based on both the definitional elements and the
required causal relationship between the plaintiff and the alleged
discriminatory practice.97 The courts, by design, occupy the role of the
contest’s referee.98 However, in discrimination cases, the court must
also evaluate the social explanations for the complained-of actions, and
thus understand the social truth of the defendant institution and evaluate
the plaintiff’s experience in that institution.99 Managing the litigation
contest and assessing the workplace’s social climate impose
incompatible roles on the court, leaving the court to default to its

93

See Thomas, Leveling Down Gender Equality, note 60, at 190-96 (noting the difficulty that
Justice Ginsburg had in deciding Sessions v. Morales-Santana).
94 See id. at 191 (noting that given Justice Ginsburg’s decision in Sessions v. Morales-Santana,
“[h]er focus was on establishing policy and restraining the government, both systemic effects,
rather than on alleviating the individual respondent’s harm.”).
95 See Tom Spiggle, The EEOC’s Proposed Changes to the Conciliation Process, FORBES (Dec.
15, 2020, 10:32 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/tomspiggle/2020/12/15/the-eeocsproposed-changes-to-the-conciliation-process/?sh=3fc56efb5dd6 (noting why most plaintiffs
cannot fully access EEOC conciliation).
96 Goldberg, supra note 32, at 660-61.
97 See Dembroff et al., supra note 54, at 3; see also City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978).
98 See How Courts Work: The Role and Structure of Courts, ABA (Sept. 9, 2019),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_education/resources/law_related_education_netw
ork/how_courts_work/court_role/.
99 See Goldberg, supra note 32, at 642-43 (“Because this determination requires more than
mere application of law to a set of findable facts, it appears to fall far outside the traditional zone
of judicial expertise and, consequently, may pose a threat to the judicial reputation for the
exercise of fair-mindedness.”).
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adversarial norms in cases, like gender discrimination cases, which
require a more nuanced analysis.
A. History of American Adversarialism
As is true with essentially all aspects of the American legal
system, its roots lie in the principally common law system of England,
which was brought to America as part of the overall colonization of the
“New World.”100 The English system at the time of colonialism was a
principally common law system,101 thus the common law as we know it
evolved through importation of ideas and doctrines. The American
system followed England in developing a colonial equity court
following the English Courts of Chancery, which were essentially
devices of the monarchy to settle local claims through equitable rather
than legal process.102 The English Chancery system was widely
criticized as being a device for graft and favoritism, and those criticisms
followed the system to the colonies when English representatives served
as chancellors presiding over colonial disputes.103 The Chancery system
was reviled in colonial America as a colonial extension of the disliked
Crown.104 However, Chancery survived the American Revolution when
its leadership changed to colonists rather than the Crown’s
appointees.105
In the early days of the American legal system, controversies
were heard either in the courts of common law or the courts of
Chancery, paralleling the English system.106 Chancery courts were
essentially equity courts, which dealt with primarily local disputes
between individuals and commercial entities.107 If you were an
100 KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 4; see id. at 7 (“To tell the
story of the rise of adversarialism in the United States is thus not only to describe the origins of
particular procedural devices . . . but also to explain how adversarial procedure as such came to
be viewed as a distinguishing feature of American national identity . . . ”); see also STEPHAN
LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO ADJUDICATION
(1988).
101 See KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 7.
102 Id. at 23-33.
103 Id. at 19.
104 See id. at 19-20; see also LANDSMAN, supra note 100.
105 See KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 19.
106 Id.; see also Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due
Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 11991210 (2005) (describing the judicial system prior to the nineteenth century in England and in
the United States).
107 See P. Tucker, The Early History of the Court of Chancery: A Comparative Study, 115 ENG.
HIST. REV. 791, 793-95 (2000).
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innkeeper in upstate New York who sought payment from a customer,
your local Chancellor most likely heard your matter.108 The Chancellor,
or judge of your local Chancery, was likely appointed because they had
roots in the community and had reached a position of trust in the
community through education, travel, or other means.109
Although many Chancery courts had some modicum of
procedural rules,110 the process of Chancery was similar to a public
airing of complaints that led to an immediate, practical decision. The
Chancery model was focused on the parties and the decision makers,
with lawyers playing a small, almost non-existent role in the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries.111 The core of the Chancery
model was the wise judge, the Chancellor, who was empowered to offer
any practical remedy and was invulnerable to appeal as the appellate
process was either non-existent or out of reach for most citizens.112 In
this way, Chancery, and its English predecessor, followed the model of
European equity courts, which employed a “quasi-inquisitorial”
approach to decision-making in essentially all controversies.113
The European systems of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
did not follow the common law model but rather focused on codes and
equitable administration through judicial process.114 English Chancery
resulted from the importation of the inquisitorial ideal from continental
Europe at a time when monarchial power was the prevalent source of
government.115
In New York, the Chancery court gained outsized importance
largely due to the influences of several important Chancellors, most
notably Chancellor Kent, who wrote extensively of the Court’s work.116
Chancellor Kent became the self-created model of a Chancery Judge—
one who is superior in intellect and wisdom thus in a singular position
to resolve the disputes of the common man.117 This expansive view of
Chancery’s role led to a growth of Chancery in New York and other
108

See KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 20, 22 (noting that
Chancery courts were available throughout the colonies).
109 Id. at 33-48.
110 See Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition, supra note 106, at 1205 n.123 (citing the FED.
EQUITY RULES OF 1822).
111 KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 32-33.
112 Id. at 19, 39-40.
113 Id. at 5-6. American equity courts adopted adversarial practices but also departed from
adversarialism in important aspects, such as employing lay judges, and, in that respect, closely
resembled European inquisitorial systems. Id.
114 See id. at 5.
115 Id. at 4.
116 Id. at 17, 22-23, 33-48.
117 Id. at 39-40.
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states, arguably increasing the expanse of Chancery to a size beyond its
functional capabilities.118
Kent and others were critical of the courts of law as being
bastions of arcane procedure and attorney intervention,119 which
resulted in overly legalistic results. Evidence in Chancery court was
taken by court officers in private, upon the parties written questions.120
This system of private inquiry was a cornerstone of Chancery, and Kent
argued this system, which minimized the role of lawyers, was essential
to a just outcome as parties and witnesses could not respond to other
testimony and craft their own testimony to meet the allegations and
expectations of other evidence.121 This system of private, judiciallydriven inquiry allowed for a fuller rendering of testimony, which Kent
maintained was essential to the just resolution of disputes.122
The expansive role of Chancery in colonial jurisdictions like
New York created procedural, legal, and practical issues for citizens
seeking prompt or predictable resolution. First, the Court of Chancery
took great pride in not following a detailed code of procedure.123
Procedure was tied to the courts of law, which required parties to secure
a lawyer to navigate the arcane process of writs and other pleading and
practice devices imported from the English courts of law.124
Under the writ-based pleading system, parties could not gain
access to the court for purposes of resolving a dispute if the nature of
the dispute did not fit into an existing category of writ. 125 This narrow
writ procedure limited possibilities for new claims or legal arguments
and cabined court of law judges to procedural administrators rather than
wise decision makers.126 If the claim pursued did fit into a known writ
category, the pleading process of writ and demurrer led to a paperdriven back and forth between attorneys that could endure for long
periods of time and result in a technical holding regarding successful

118

Id. at 75.
See id. at 48-55.
120 Id. at 27.
121 See id. at 56 (citing Hamersley v. Lambert, 2 Johns Ch. 495, 432-33 (N.Y. Ch.
1817)).
122 Id. at 58-59.
123 See id. at 62-63 (explaining New York Chancery’s tension between Chancery’s quasiinquisitorial logic requiring a large staff and its choice instead to rely on a small staff on a caseby-case basis).
124 Id. at 11.
125 Id. at 53.
126 See id.
119
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procedure rather than a resolution on the facts.127 However, the courts
of law were the first to publish law and,128 in that regard, allowed for a
precedent that was instructive to lawyers and their clients.
In Chancery, any given case could yield a different result based
on the evidence given and the whims of the Chancery judge.129 The best
predictors of outcome in Chancery were the disposition of the judge and
equitable position of the parties.130 In the courts of law, the common law
set a course for parties to follow with the recorded precedent of England
and America available to refine understanding.131
Finally, the expansive version of Chancery required a
considerable amount of infrastructure as court officers were needed to
take testimony and evidence both in writing and viva voce.132 Those
officers, deemed masters and/or examiners, were needed in many small
towns for Chancery to do its work as travel from one town to another
created difficulties for parties seeking court resolution of predominantly
local claims.133 Using the New York Chancery example, this system
could only function if well-funded and well supported. When New York
failed to properly fund Kent’s construct of an expansive Chancery, the

Id. (explaining that “[t]he common law and its writ-based system of pleading allowed
plaintiffs to file suit only to the extent that their particular complaint happened to fall within one
of the established writs (or formulas) allowing for litigation[,]” thereby resulting in some unjust
holdings).
128 Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States
Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION:
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 40 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (explaining the history of
precedent); see also LANDSMAN, supra note 100, at 19.
129 See Tucker, supra note 107, at 795; see also Shruti Rajagopalan, Adversarial Versus
Inquisitorial Systems: Error and Valuation, 12 J. BUS. VALUATION & ECON. LOSS ANALYSIS
311, 312 (2017).
130 See Tucker, supra note 107, at 795.
131 See Charles R. Eloshway, Say It Ain't So: Non-Precedential Opinions Exceed the Limits of
Article III Powers, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 632, 638 (2002) (“English common law was judgemade; the courts created it, ‘bit by bit, as cases successively arose and were determined.’
Although reliance by the English courts on prior decisions, or precedents, had, to some extent,
been the norm for many years in early English history, systematic use of precedents in the
development of common law did not begin until the publication of reports became
commonplace, sometime in the fourteenth century. These recorded judgments not only became
evidence of the law, but also sources of it, and constrained succeeding judges. Case reporting
and reliance on precedents are, therefore, historically related in English common law.”).
132 KESSLER , Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 68-72, 86. Viva voce refers
to evidence taken by oral examination rather than written. See id. at 329.
133 Id. at 13; see also Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition, supra note 106, at 1207, 1207 n.138
(explaining that “examiners” took testimony locally while the court appointed private
individuals known as “commissioners” to take testimony from out-of-town witnesses).
127
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time and cost involved in equitable resolution became a practical
impediment to the effectiveness of the system.134
To wit, the ideal of Chancery as originally set forth by Kent and
others began to flounder in the early and middle parts of the nineteenth
century.135 Several factors initiated the decline of Chancery and the
ultimate merging of the courts of law and equity, most notably
documented in the Field Code.136 First, Chancery itself allowed lawyers
to participate in the collection of evidence viva voce through the
Master’s or Examiner’s inquiry.137 As such, people were able to see the
effect of lawyers first-hand without traveling to the state capital or other
location of a court of law.138
Secondly, lawyers themselves began to take on more important
roles in local society.139 Lawyers became civic orators, examples of the
popular notion of Republican civic virtue, who spoke publicly as elected
leaders and as lawyers on behalf of citizens in public fora such as
legislative arenas and the courts themselves, including Chancery.140 The
lawyers strove to be the best orators and used their client’s matters to
perform eloquent statements and arguments before the courts.141 Civic
social clubs filled with lawyers debating social and political issues
creating forums for the oratorical skills of the lawyer.142 Important
lawyers of the time began to extol the virtue of cross examination, a
134 See KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, 86-89 (discussing the
Kent’s opinion in Remson v. Remson which allowed for evidence to be taken by masters and
opened the door to more adversarial process and a more costly dual (inquisitorial and
adversarial) model of dispute resolution).
135 Id. at 62.
136 Id. at 9, 17, 142 (describing Field Code as “creati[ng] of a uniﬁed body of procedure bridging
the divide between law and equity”); Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition, supra note 106 at
1234-35, 1235 n.291.
137 See KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 86 (“Kent held that ‘the
requisite proofs ought to be taken on written interrogatories, prepared by the parties, and
approved by the master, or by viva voce examination, as the parties shall deem most expedient,
or the master shall think proper to direct, in the given case.’”).
138 See id. at 86, 117.
139 Id. at 152; see also Robert W. Gordon, Lawyers as the American Aristocracy, 20 STAN.
LAW. 2, 2 (1985); Russell G. Pearce, Lawyers as America’s Governing Class: The Formation
and Dissolution of the Original Understanding of the American Lawyer’s Role, 8 U. CHI. L.
SCH. ROUNDTABLE 381, 383 (2001).
140 KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 156-57; see also Gordon,
supra note 139, at 2-3.
141 See KESSLER , Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 13-14.
142 See also Gordon, supra note 139, at 4 (discussing Justice Joseph Story’s use of various
public forums in addition to his position on the United States Supreme Court, including writing
public commentaries on the law for use by lawyers and schoolchildren and conducting practiceoriented clinics within his circuit sessions).
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technique not traditionally present in Chancery Court as evidence was
taken in private.143 Newspapers reported on lawyer craft and skill in
cross examination leading to dramatic and public trial moments of
confession or revelation.144 However, the Courts of Chancery did not
allow for this level of lawyer participation.145 The growth of lawyers’
importance meant that citizens began to seek resolution in the courts of
law where the lawyers had greater influence, and matters were heard
publicly before a judge or, most desirably, before a jury.146
B. Adversarialism’s Impact on Employment Litigation
The shift away from Chancery was a shift away from the quasiinquisitorial system of dispute resolution. Chancery courts most closely
followed the models of European conciliation courts which served as
the principal courts for commercial and labor disputes.147 Conciliation
courts were described as “a lawyer-free realm in which a respected local
authority figure relied on his stature within the community to persuade
the parties to agree to a compromise, derived from his own sense of
justice rather than the formal rule of law.”148 In American Chancery, the
Chancellor served as the “respected local authority figure,” leading the
parties to a just resolution.149
In Europe, various models of conciliation courts persisted.150
Notably, the French created a set of labor courts known as the conseils
de prud’hommes, which were designed to manage labor strife as France
became more market-oriented following the Napoleonic Wars.151 The
143 Id. at 104-05, 164-65 (“Numerous legal biographies, novels and newspaper articles [in the
early nineteenth century] celebrated the art of cross-examination and the lawyers who had
mastered it.”).
144 Id. at 165, 170.
145
See Rajagopalan, supra note 129.
146 See KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 98-100, 158 (explaining
that the “jury-reliant common-law” was considered “uniquely liberty-promoting.”).
147 KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 5, 14, 203 (defining quasiinquisitorial system as “adopt[ing] many components of the inquisitorial type, including, most
importantly, significant elements of judicial control . . . . Indeed, the only ways in which equity
procedure unmistakably followed the adversarial model was that it authorized the parties to
initiate the litigation and to determine its scope and content. Given these limited but important
respects in which equity embraced the adversarial model, I refer to its procedure as ‘quasiinquisitorial,’ rather than inquisitorial.”).
148 Id. at 201.
149 See id.
150
Id. at 202.
151 Id. at 202-03; see also B.W. Napier, The French Labour Courts—An Institution in
Transition, 42 MOD. L. REV. 270, 270 (1979) (explaining that “conseils de prud’hommes has
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French conciliation courts, the bureau de conciliation, were instituted
by the French revolutionaries in 1790 to hear disputes between citizens
on a wide range of civil matters.152 Parties could proceed to actual
litigation only after process within the bureau de conciliation.153 The
labor courts were an offshoot of the main conciliation court.154
Despite the advantages of conciliation courts,155 the emergence
of an American identity interfered with similar growth in American law
and procedure. The middle part of the nineteenth century saw a
universal turn towards free enterprise and the growth of free market
economies.156 Americans became even more entrenched in the
commitment to political liberty and free enterprise, thus rejecting ideas
emerging from English monarchical tradition or European models of
government.157 American idealism valued the individual and his liberty
interests and did not permit the establishment of institutions that
encouraged deference to a learned judge rather than compliance with
the formal rule of law.158 The emerging American ideal valued selfinterest, not community.159 As the free market economy grew, the
individual and his own path to wealth and power became a more
important narrative,160 superseding the ideal of the wise authority figure,
which was the backbone of Chancery and equity.
This value system created an ideal atmosphere for the lawyerorator to emerge as the main character in legal dispute and reform. The
private lawyer became the device used by people of power to access
justice in the courts of law.161 The lawyer was educated on the relevant
process and procedure and knew how to access relief for his client.162

been the cause of friction between trade unions, employers’ associations and governments in
France.”).
152 See Amalia D. Kessler, Marginalization and Myth: The Corporatist Roots France’s
Forgotten Elective Judiciary, 58 AM. J. COMP. L., 679, 688-95 (2010); see also Napier, supra
note 151, at 276.
153 KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 202.
154 Id. at 203.
155 Id. at 203-205 (referencing Bentham’s writings of the “virtues and vices of conciliation”).
156 See Capitalism, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capitalism.asp (last
visited Mar. 20, 2022).
157 See KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 7, 12.
158 Id. at 7.
159 See Robert E. Lane, Individualism and the Market Society, 25 LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: NOMOS
374, 376 (1983).
160 Id. at 374-75.
161 See Gordon, supra note 139, at 5.
162 See id. at 79; see also ROBERT BOCKING STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICA FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 52 (Lawbook Exchange Ltd. 2001) (1983).
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He was the embodiment of the Republican civic virtue of debate,163 thus
a living example of core American values. Also, in the mid-nineteenth
century legal education changed, becoming more formalized and
“scientific” through Langdell’s introduction of the case method at
Harvard Law School.164 In sum, the legal profession began to develop
into a profession like medicine, that was revered and respected for
breadth and depth of knowledge as well as extraordinary skill.165
In law, this extraordinary skill was demonstrated by public
communication, either writing or, more notably, oration in the courts of
law.166 Without a dual system of solicitor and barrister,167 every
American lawyer held the potential for great oration and had access to
the court forum. To best illustrate his special importance in the
American system, a lawyer needed a court forum where his skills were
on display. As such, the structure of Chancery with its private inquiry
and judge-driven process failed to allow lawyers to perform as
desired.168 After all, Chancery was quasi-inquisitorial, much like the
conciliation courts abroad, and relied on informal adjudication with less
emphasis on formal legal rules. 169 On the other hand, the courts of law
were legalistic,170 so the trained lawyer provided the only entre into the
procedure and substance of American law.
Seizing on this opportunity, lawyers began to advocate for a
more adversarial procedure in the law courts.171 The role of cross
examination and argument expanded, and procedure itself, which
created many opportunities for litigation, worked towards a more formal
construct.172 This focus on adversarial justice created a zero sum
mentality for civil litigation wherein one party must win and another
See Gordon, supra note 139, at 7 (“Even in the course of adversary proceedings, the
republican lawyer was advised to remember that his primary role was the collegial one of
helping the judge reach a correct decision.”).
164 STEVENS, supra note 162, at 36-37, 52.
165 Id. at 5-6; see also Gordon, supra note 139, at 6 (“Law, with its many opportunities for
public careers in politics and public letters, was naturally attractive to talent of a certain bent,
namely, talent with an ambition for public fame and glory rather than business success.”).
166 See KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 158-63; see also Gordon,
supra note 139, at 6 (discussing the importance of forensic argument before juries).
167 Harry Cohen, The Divided Legal Profession in England and Wales – Can Barristers and
Solicitors Ever Be Fused?, 12 J. LEGAL PROF. 7, 7 (1987) (discussing that “[B]arristers are
advocates and specialists in various fields of law, and solicitors are lawyers who deal with clients
directly . . .”).
168 See Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition, supra note 106, at 1210.
169 See id., at 1153, 1193.
170
See KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 39 (referring to courts
of law as “rule-bound.”).
171 Id. at 62, 151.
172 Id. at 151, 164-65,
163
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must lose.173 Adversarial litigation stood in sharp contrast to equity
which allowed parties to privately give evidence to a neutral official,
then await the compromise decision of a learned judge.174 In the
Chancery system, as in other quasi-inquisitorial systems, the parties to
the dispute could resolve matters with reputations and relationships
intact.175 In adversarial litigation, the dispute rendered a winner and
loser.176 The winner then held the position of power over past and future
adversaries, whereas the loser worked to retain its position and regain
its credibility. This dynamic encouraged greater adversarialism as each
contest put a great deal at risk such that parties were best advised to fight
with all means available to protect their future interests.
Although heightened adversarialism served valid goals in some
litigation, it did little to protect the socially less advantaged. The French
created conciliation courts like the conseils de prud’hommes to
ameliorate the potentially harsh effects of the market driven economy
by protecting the most vulnerable members of society, such as the
workers.177 Conciliation courts allowed parties to mediate before
litigating; thus, creating an early point of entry for workers who were
suffering from harsh or unfair labor conditions.178 In the French system,
a worker could bring a matter regarding unsafe working conditions to
the conseils and have this matter resolved with his employer without
need of an attorney and without the expense of court process.179
Absent a similar mechanism in the late nineteenth century and
early twentieth century American legal system, workers were required
to access the courts of law to seek justice for harm caused by working

173 See Monroe H. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, 1 CHAP. L. REV. 57,
57 (1998); see generally ROBERT KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM, IV (2001).
174 Freedman, supra note 173, at 74; Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition, supra note 106, at
1217, 1225.
175 See KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, 27-28. Kessler describes
the practice in English Chancery, the precursor to American Chancery, wherein testimonial
evidence was offered to the court in writing, not viva voce as was done in courts of law, and
taken privately, described as secretly, rather than in open court. This private, written process
allowed litigants to edit or withdraw testimony if the testimony included falsehoods, thus
avoiding the public exposure of cross-examination. The private inquiry process was premised
on the logic that most witnesses were truthful and honorable and most likely to provide truthful
testimony in a private setting. Id.
176 See Freedman, supra note 173, at 57.
177 See KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 203, 284.
178
Chester P. Higby & Caroline B. Willis, Industry and Labor Under Napoleon, 54 AM. HIST.
REV. 465, 465 (1948); see also Kessler, Marginalization and Myth, supra note 152, at 704.
179 Higby & Willis, supra note 178.
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conditions.180 If workers did access courts of law with labor disputes,
the dispute created both financial and reputational risk for the defendant
employer.181 Not only might the employer face the payment of damages
or adjustment to more expensive practices, but the employer would also
be called upon to answer to public allegations that it did not care for
workers.182 These allegations could disrupt the public reputation of the
company and the private reputations of its principals. As wealth
typically fell on the employers’ side of the equation, defendant
employers were incentivized to hire the best adversaries and fight the
labor claims vigorously, leaving behind the possibility of a private,
mutually agreeable resolution.183
C. How Adversarialism Fails to Foster Social Change in the
Workplace
The Anglo-American model is adversarial, the opposite of
inquisitorial in that the “search for truth” in an adversarial system is
deemed to require the actions of attorneys as champions in a battle
between the parties.184 The law court system elevates the role of the
parties and their lawyers, placing the judge in the role of legal referee.185
In a quasi-inquisitorial system, the judge and court officers serve as the
fact gatherers, gathering information through private inquiry,
principally through court-directed discovery.186 The inquisitorial
process is slow and subject to the criticism of bureaucratic systems;

180

See Kathleen Thelen, Employer Organization and the Law: American Exceptionalism in
Comparative Perspective, 83 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 23, 23-28 (2020) (discussing the economic
legal context of labor organization in the United States).
181 See id. at 37 (noting the role of litigation against labor unions in the nineteenth century).
182 See id. at 38-39 (describing the coordination between labor and management to address
public backlash against management; however, the cooperation “withered as
organizations . . . encouraged them instead to mobilize the courts in battles that focused on the
individual rights of firms and workers.” See also Remedies for Employment Discrimination,
U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/remedies-employment-discrimination (last visited May 13,
2022) (describing available remedies for employment discrimination, including economic
consequences).
183See, e.g., Thelen, supra note 180, at 36 (discussing how employers used court process to
challenge labor organizations through organizations such as the American Anti-Boycott
Association whose “express purpose was to shape authoritative interpretation of particular laws
by seeking secure court decisions . . . that would establish that unions too were subject to
antitrust provisions . . . and to establish that an individual’s right to work was to be protected
just as vigorously as a business person’s right to run his own business.”).
184 KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 4.
185 Id. at 5.
186 Id. at 85.
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however, it may offer benefits in cases where the adversarialism of the
parties may have interfered with the overall best outcome for the parties.
This Article argues that gender discrimination cases serve as an
example of the type of controversy which would benefit from a quasiinquisitorial approach. As discussed in Section I, gender discrimination
cases necessarily involve an inquiry into the workplace’s social context
and raise social as well as legal issues.187 Dispute resolution that focuses
on the parties’ experiences in the workplace and the “social truth” of the
workplace would allow the litigating parties to use the controversy not
just as a contest to determine who is right, but as a means of improving
the overall workplace culture. In gender discrimination cases where
litigation can prompt social change, the parties are not positioned to
collaborate on a remedy which addresses the injury to the plaintiff and
better positions the defendant to change practices and avoid future
exposure.
III.

NON-ADVERSARIAL APPROACHES TO WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION

Adversarial litigation positions the parties as enemies with both
working to protect their own interests, whether that is maximizing
economic recovery for the plaintiff or mitigating public relations
impacts or financial risk to the defendant.188 Although mediation and
other alternative dispute resolution mechanisms are designed to allow
parties to find common ground in the course of adversarial litigation,
the postures in settlement discussions flow from the overall adversarial
context, so parties must strategize their best position in mediation, e.g.,
what to share and when.189
The need for strategy in settlement negotiations interferes with
open communication and positive resolution.190 Most often, lawsuits
settle after an evaluation of economic and reputational exposure for
defendant balanced against a risk of loss and limited recovery for the
187

See supra Part I.
See generally Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984); Stephen A.
Saltzburg, Lawyers, Clients and the Adversary System, 37 MERCER L. REV. 647, 662 (1986)
(describing that lawyers have a duty to represent their clients zealously).
189 See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Post-Modern,
Multi-Cultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 5, 37 (1996) (arguing that many forms of
alternative dispute resolution are “becoming corrupted by the persistence of adversarial
values.”). But see Saltzburg, supra note 188 (stating that an argument in an adversarial process
assures competent representation).
190 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 189, at 37.
188
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plaintiff. Ultimately, the process devolves to a cost/benefit analysis
which requires parties to protect as much turf as possible while ceding
ground only where risk analysis indicates concession is the best course.
This process does not allow the parties to work together in problem
solving.191 This section explores possible alternatives to the adversarial
approach which may, in part or in full, be informative models for
American workplace discrimination cases.
A. The Possible Solution: A Quasi-Inquisitorial Approach
In resolving workplace discrimination cases, a more effective
alternative to using traditional, adversarial tactics could be to apply a
quasi-inquisitorial approach.
Although in 1938 the Rules of Civil Procedure merged law and
equity, the Federal Courts continue to sit in equity when making certain
determinations.192 When the trial court occupies this role, the court
theoretically moves into a quasi-inquisitorial role wherein the judge
makes fairness-based determinations based on the evidence presented
by the parties.193 In equity, the judge, not the jury, serves as the factfinder and applies the facts found to reach an “equitable” end premised
on the roles and needs of both parties.194 Equity functions well when
remedies sought require action or inaction.195 The court can determine
that a party must reinstate or promote an employee based on the court’s
factual findings.196 When equitable remedies are sought, we accept the
trial court’s function as a fairness agency.197 Thus, why not accept the
same function when the controversy seeks non-equitable relief such as
money damages?
The American adversarial system has experimented with more
inquisitorial approaches to private conflict, principally through
Chanceller Kent’s New York Chancery courts.198 Most attribute the
191

Id.
See Thomas O. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV.
429, 431-32 (2003).
193 Id. at 444.
194 Id. at 451.
195 Id. (“Whenever a court of law was competent to take cognizance of a right and had the
power to proceed to a judgment that afforded plain, adequate, and complete relief, the plaintiff
had to proceed at law . . .”).
196 See Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d 1413, 1424 (4th Cir. 1991) (discussing the interplay
between equitable and legal remedies in regard to reinstatement and front pay under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act).
197 See Main, supra note 192 at 478; see also KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism,
supra note 1, at 4.
198 See KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at 6.
192
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decline of Chancery to the emerging influence of lawyers as orators and
the outsized importance of Chancery judges who were accused of
overreaching in their inquisitorial role.199 However, there are other
models of inquisitorial decision-making that are worth consideration
when evaluating claims which impact not only legal remedies but
ongoing cultural contexts, like workplace discrimination claims.
First, it should be noted that the proper term for Chancery and
other models is quasi-inquisitorial as no relevant system is fully
inquisitorial, meaning without the influence of attorneys in the
process.200 However, the hallmark of a quasi-inquisitorial system is its
use of judges or other court officials as both inquirers and fact finders.201
Quasi-inquisitorial systems often involve blind fact gathering processes
that use conventional aspects of American civil discovery, such as the
oral deposition, but structure the fact gathering through court process
rather than through attorney-driven self-directed discovery.202 In a
quasi-inquisitorial system, a witness’s testimony may be gathered
through oral deposition in front of a judge or court officer without cross
examination or even the presence of the adverse parties.203
The quasi-inquisitorial French counsiels de prud’hommes began
as labor courts, thus supporting the argument that even in the early days
of private dispute resolution there was an acknowledgement that labor
disputes involved special circumstances.204 In many private disputes,
the parties have had limited interaction either before or after the actions
generating the dispute, thus parties can walk away from the court
resolution without a need for future interaction.205 However, in cases
involving the workplace, the parties often share the goal of remaining
in their relationship.206
The French system allows those parties to meet face to face and
discuss the relevant issues before a knowledgeable person, preserving
199

See Pearce, supra note 139 (discussing that the role of a lawyer is to be a public orator).
See Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition, supra note 106, at 1187.
201 Id. at 1240.
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 See Kessler, Marginalization and Myth, supra note 152, at 701 (“At least as important were
the labor courts, or conseils de prud’hommes, established by the Napoleonic regime in the early
nineteenth century in order to help quell the extensive labor strife that emerged in the wake of
the Napoleonic Wars and the widespread economic disorder that these generated.”).
205 See generally id.
206 See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (explaining that the plaintiff wanted
to be promoted to partner at her accounting firm); see also Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc., 928 F.2d
1413, 1422 (4th Cir. 1991) (explaining that the plaintiff wanted to continue to be employed by
Uniroyal).
200
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the possibility that the parties could resume their workplace
relationship.207 The French labor court system allows for the possibility
that workers and employers can evaluate the social truth of the
workplace from both points of view.208 This is as opposed to the winnertake-all posture of the adversarial system which imposes no obligation
on the employer to alter the workplace, or their actions, if they are the
winner.209
Adjusting the adversarial system to a quasi-inquisitorial system
similar to the French example of labor courts is not realistic and most
likely not desirable. The French system is oriented towards conciliation
and reflects an overall more corporatist attitude to employment.210 The
adjudication process is managed by elected bureaucrats who are often
regarded as biased towards the labor organizations that support their
candidacies.211 A quasi-inquisitorial system in the French model values
bureaucratized justice, whereas the American adversarial system values
its distinctive commitment to “judicial creativity, common sense, and
equity.”212 This gap alone may be sufficient to defeat attempts to create
an American version of conciliation devoted to employment disputes.
However, as Kessler points out, understandings of legal systems are not
only based on rules, practices, precedents, and institutional formats, but
also on a set of myths that shape legal culture and professional
identity.213 These myths operate like social truths in that as they
sediment, they become the truth of what we value in the system of
private conflict resolution.214 The question is whether the American
system, which values contest as the mechanism of truth, could be altered
to allow for a quasi-inquisitorial approach without disrupting the myth
of victory as vindication.

207 See Napier, supra note 151 (discussing the jurisdiction, organization, personnel, and
procedure of the conseils de prud’hommes). See generally Pete Burgess, Susan Corby & Paul
L. Lautreille, Lay Judges and Labor Courts: A Question of Legitimacy, 35 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL’Y J. 191 (2014) (discussing the role of lay judges in European labor courts).
208 See generally Kessler, Marginalization and Myth, supra note 152.
209 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 189, at 66.
210 See Kessler, Marginalization and Myth, supra note 152, at 712 (defining “corporatist
attitude” as control of a country by large groups, especially businesses).
211 Id. at 681 (“[J]udges lack formal judicial (and usually legal) training of any kind and are
elected mid-career to serve temporary terms of office. Those thus elected to office belong to the
particular profession (and social) groups whose disputes they will resolve and which, in turn,
are responsible for electing them.”).
212 See id. at 716.
213 See id. at 720.
214 See ALVESSON & SKÖLDBERG, supra note 2, at 27.
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In the twentieth century, the role of the lawyer shifted from a
public orator to a public interpreter of law.215 Lawyers have become
more subject-specific in their knowledge and have been disincentivized
to develop as orators as the great ideal of the public trial nearly ceases
to exist.216 Thus, most lawyers will never argue a case before a jury in a
public court, never donning the armor of the gladiator.217 Also, the court
as a public forum is a dwindling ideal.218
Many controversies, including many workplace controversies,
are litigated in administrative courts or managed through extra-judicial
settlement mechanisms.219 Administrative courts may technically be
open to the public but are often difficult to access since the business of
agencies is not conducted in traditional courthouses, as some agencies
occupy office space that appear outwardly to be private.220 Many
courthouse spaces limit access for security reasons or limit courtroom
attendance based on party requests or space limitations.221 To
individuals who do not have experience appearing before them, federal
courts do not present themselves as open fora in many jurisdictions.222
Furthermore, the federal judiciary currently includes a
substantial number of non-Article III decisionmakers who preside over
dispositive matters.223 Federal magistrate judges have increased in
number largely in response to concerns raised by the federal judiciary,
and others, regarding full dockets and slow processes.224 The creation
of magistrate and other non-Article III judicial officers allows for
215

See Gordon, supra note 139.
See Pearce, supra note 139, at 397 (discussing lawyers’ evolving role in shaping corporate
culture in the 1960s).
217 See Jeffrey Q. Smith & Grant R. Macqueen, Going, Going, But Not Quite Gone: Trials
Continue to Decline in Federal and State Courts. Does it Matter?, 101 JUDICATURE 26, 27
(2017).
218 See Judith Resnik, Whither or Whether Adjudication, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101, 1103 (2006)
(“Given the proliferation of the sites of adjudication and the pressures to seek alternative forms
of resolution, I am not confident that adjudication will be as available one hundred years hence
as it is today, nor that its substitutes will permit easy public observation and public knowledge
of the deployment of power, both public and private.”).
219 Id. at 1131.
220 Id. at 1132 (“As a practical matter, however, even if one has a ‘right’ to attend these various
[administrative] proceedings, it is difficult to find them.”).
221 Id. at 1126 (noting that the Boston federal courthouse housing the court for the Western
District of Massachusetts was instructed to keep the lights on for two hours per day in each
courtroom but only does so about one-half of the time the courthouse is open).
222 See JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY
AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011).
223 Resnik, Whither or Whether Adjudication, supra note 218, at 1118.
224 Id. at 1114-15 (discussing the rise of magistrate judgeships).
216
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political expediency as magistrates and similar officers may be
appointed by the District Court judges without a political confirmation
process.225 As civil court practice in federal court has moved away from
a judge with lifetime tenure playing a singularly central role in civil
litigation, one can argue that a further adjustment to the system that
allows for a more inquisitorial process is hardly an existential threat to
the American system. As of now, civil cases are handled in part, and
sometimes in full, by bureaucratic judges who are deemed to have
special expertise.226 Arguably, the structure for a quasi-inquisitorial
system attending to workplace discrimination cases is already in place.
B. The Non-Solutions: System Approaches that Inhibit the
Reconciliation of Social Truths
It is appropriate to suggest that non-adversarial alternatives
already exist. Alternative dispute resolution (ADR) devices allow
parties to discuss the social truth of an organization and assess possible
avenues for change to improve the employee experience and the
employer’s business position.227 However, the options most often
considered are those which flow from the adversarial model—options
which involve the resolution of a disputed claim. As settlement itself
presupposes a dispute, the context of settlement derives itself from the
context of the dispute prompting questions regarding what evidence
plaintiffs should reveal to support their demand and how much
defendants should offer to take full advantage of the settlement
posture.228 The stage for settlement is set by the threat of a later contest,
a staging which undermines any realistic goal of cultural change in the
workplace.229

225

Id.
See id. at 1123. “Judges are now multi-taskers, sometimes managers of lawyers and of cases,
sometimes mediators, and sometimes referral sources, sending people outside courts to
alternative fora.” Id.
227
Todd B. Carver & Albert A. Vondra, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Why it Doesn’t Work
and Why It Does, HARVARD BUS. REV. (May-June 1994), https://hbr.org/1994/05/alternativedispute-resolution-why-it-doesnt-work-and-why-it-does.
228 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 189, at 17-18. Menkel-Meadow explains that the
adversarial system may no longer be the best method for our legal system to deal with all
matters. She criticizes the binary nature of the adversarial system and notes that “the ‘false’ or
‘exaggerated’ representation of oppositional stories may oversimplify the facts and not permit
adequate consideration of fact interpretations or conclusions that either fall somewhere in
between, or totally outside of, the range of the lawyer’s presentations.” The binary presentation
of evidence filters into alternative dispute resolution processes when those processes derive
from the binary adversarial context. Id.
229 See generally id.; Resnik, Whither or Whether Adjudication, supra note 218.
226
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Mediation, Settlement, and Other Adversarial-Based
Alternative Dispute Resolution Mechanisms

The parameters of mediation and settlement are carved out of
civil litigation’s basic structure.230 Although private parties have always
been able to seek an extra-judicial remedy for their conflicts, whether
before or during litigation, the mechanisms which drive settlement
evolved through a series of structural changes to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.231 Further, the evolution of alternative dispute
resolution has, like arbitration, become its own industry.232 Trial courts
certify mediators and mandate settlement conferences as a prerequisite
to placing a case on the civil trial calendar.233 Judges openly express to
litigants their opinions on the viability or advisability of settlement,
sometimes stating an assessment of the strength of the case and
assessing the risks between the parties.234 The court’s open embrace of
settlement is not an error—settlement does benefit the parties in many
situations. What is important to note though is that settlement arrived at
through mediation or court-ordered process is assessed as an alternative
to adversarial litigation, thus the settlement is a substitute for the
winner-take-all trial.235 Building mediation and settlement models as
dependencies on civil litigation’s adversarial structure eliminates the
opportunity to reimagine a different approach to be applied in certain
types of civil cases.236
For example, consider a negligence case wherein the parties are
an injured plaintiff and a defendant accused of a negligent action.
Assume the parties had no association prior to the event creating the
230 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a) (“In any action, the Court may order the attorneys and any
unrepresented parties to appear for one or more pretrial conferences for such purposes as . . . (5)
facilitating settlement.”).
231 Amy M. Pugh & Richard A. Bales, The Inherent Power of the Federal Courts to Compel
Participation in Nonbinding Forms of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 42 DUQ. L. REV. 1, 3
(2003).
232 See generally id. (discussing sources of judicial authority for compelling party to mediate
and settle).
233 See, e.g., N.C.R. 1.(c).(1) (promulgated under N.C.G.S.A. [S] 7A-38.1(e)) (providing that
North Carolina Superior Court judges may require parties to attend mediated settlement
conferences).
234 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 385 n.52 (1982) (“[A] trial
court ought not to force a settlement . . . but [may suggest] the advisability of settlement.”).
235 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 189, at 37 (arguing that positive developments in
alternative dispute resolution “are becoming corrupted by the persistence of adversarial
values.”).
236 See id. at 36 (noting that, in cases which involve a “genuine search for truth,” a quasiinquisitorial process may provide a sensible alternative to adversarial process).
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case and will most likely never interact with each other again outside of
the current litigation. The decision of whether to settle such a case is
largely based on the risk assessment around financial loss, risks which
are calculated based on the likelihood of either party’s success at trial.
The parties in this hypothetical can litigate aggressively as a means of
either winning at trial or achieving the better settlement position, and
then walk away without concern for repairing a damaged relationship.
In cases like this, the court is well advised to encourage settlement,
formally or informally, as the parties positions can be evaluated in
monetary terms.237
But the issues around settlement read differently when the
underlying litigation centers on an ongoing relationship.238 In litigation
involving workplace discrimination, for example a claim of sexual
harassment under Title VII, the plaintiff-employee may seek a remedy
that involves a return to the workplace.239 Also, the plaintiff’s complaint
may implicate greater concerns about the given work environment
which need to be addressed by the defendant-employer even if the
plaintiff ceases to be an employee.240 Even if the plaintiff-employee
does not return to the workplace after litigation, the workplace culture
can expose the defendant-employer to future risk and expose other
employees to potential harm.241
In the sexual harassment example, assume the plaintiff is
alleging that her supervisor harassed her through inappropriate conduct
and threatened to fire her if she did not engage in sexual activity.242 The
plaintiff-employee files a suit for sexual harassment. The defendantemployer mounts a vigorous defense which requires a certain degree of
See id. The typical negligence-based dispute does not involve a “search for truth” but
rather seeks a practical, most likely monetary, remedy for the injured party. This type of case
functions well as an adversarial challenge with attorneys (or parties) arguing the relevant
factual/legal position without a reference to cultural issues operating contextually to the
conflict. In Menkel-Meadow’s language, the case does not raise a “public question” requiring
resolution in open court. See id. at 32.
238 See id. at 34-35 (citing Susan Sturm & Lani Guinier, Reflections on Teaching About Race
and Gender, 53 J. LEGAL EDUC. 515 (2003)) (discussing the use of multi-layered procedure at
the Center for Interracial/Inter-ethnic Conflict Resolution at the UCLA School of Law designed
to avoid debate-like adversarial presentations in workshop on affirmative action).
239 See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (explaining how Ann Hopkins
steadfastly sought a return to her workplace at the partner level, refusing significant money
offers in settlement in pursuit of a return-to-work remedy).
240 See Catherine R. Dunham, Third Generation Discrimination: The Ripple Effects of Gender
Bias in the Workplace, 51 AKRON L. REV. 56 (2017).
241 See id. at 59-61 (discussing implicit bias and the effects of bias in the workplace).
242 Know Your Rights at
Work: Sexual Harassment, EQUAL RTS. ADVOCATES,
https://www.equalrights.org/issue/economic-workplace-equality/sexual-harassment/
(last
visited May 6, 2022).
237
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support for the supervisor who is the subject of the allegations. If the
case moves forward to settlement, not only could the process quiet or
discredit the plaintiff-employee’s allegations, but it also overlooks the
impact the alleged conduct may have had on others in the workplace.243
Others in the workplace may have endured similar experiences.
However, if the defendant-employer wins at trial or closes the case
through an amenable settlement, it has no incentive to manage the
supervisor or change the workplace other than an incentive that arises
from practical business reasons.244 The cultural issue remains
unlitigated.
The changes in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which have
enhanced the role of mediated settlement in civil cases have largely
derived from concerns raised by judges and court personnel regarding
crowded dockets.245 Concerns about court efficiency are valid concerns
as delays do affect parties.246 However, docket efficiencies must be
weighed against the access issues raised when litigants are
disincentivized to litigate their controversies before a judge or jury.247
The best solution for deficiencies in adversarial litigation should not be
the coerced settlement of claims. In fact, the rise in settlements should
be evaluated not as indicator of success in the system’s docket
management but as an indicator of failure in the system.
ii.

Arbitration

Arbitration presents itself as another viable option to full-blown
adversarial litigation. Arbitration operates under its own rules which,
although similar to Anglo-American rules of civil court practice, allow
for some departures from adversarial process.248 For example,
243 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 189, at 32 (noting that some litigation involves “public
questions.”).
244 See Joni Hersch, Can the Media Solve the Problem of Sexual Harassment, GEO. J. INT’L
AFFS. (Mar. 1, 2018), https://gjia.georgetown.edu/2018/03/01/can-media-solve-problem-ofsexual-harassment/ (“In the absence of information about the actual risk of sexual harassment,
there is little incentive for firms to take on the expense of lowering the risk of sexual
harassment.”).
245 See generally Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat
to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542 (1969) (discussing the
problems of crowded dockets in the courts of appeals).
246 See Resnik, Managerial Judges, supra note 234, at 390 (discussing court delay and its
impact on court proceedings).
247 Id. at 441-42 (outlining economic disincentives to litigation).
248
See, e.g., AAA Court- and Time-tested Rules and Procedures, AM. ARB. ASS’N,
https://www.adr.org/Rules (last visited Mar. 1, 2022); Download Current Rules, Procedures
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arbitration regimes eschew juries and do not occur in open court, which
should reduce the need for attorneys to perform as public orators.249
However, arbitration schemes conform in substance to the adversarial
systems they are designed to replace.250 The parties perform the basic
aspects of a trial, resolving disputes regarding evidence, facts, and law
before a panel of arbitrators.251 In many cases the parties have agreed to
abide by the arbitrators’ decision, so the effect of the arbitration is a final
and unappealable judgment.252 As such, arbitration can create an even
higher stakes contest than traditional civil litigation.253
Arbitrators are often chosen based on subject-specific expertise,
a system more in line with an employment-focused conciliation court.254
A panel of arbitrators with experience in the workplace environment in
controversy may be more likely to understand the cultural dynamics of
the workplace, and thus more likely to understand the lasting effects of
the decision for the parties and other workers.255 However, if the rules
of the game remain the same, a different referee cannot change the
game.

and Forms, JUD. ARB. & MEDIATION SERVS., INC., https://www.jamsadr.com/rules-download/
(last visited Mar. 1, 2022); see also AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., WHERE WHITE MEN RULE: HOW THE
SECRETIVE SYSTEM OF FORCED ARBITRATION HURTS WOMEN AND MINORITIES (2021) (noting
that AAA and JAMS are the two largest consumer and arbitration providers in the country).
249 See Pamela K. Bookman, The Arbitration-Litigation Paradox, 72 VAND. L. REV. 1119, 1123
(2019) (“On one hand, arbitration could be understood simply as a private, contract-based
dispute resolution system in which decisionmakers render binding adjudication of parties’
claims. Litigation, on the other hand, refers to the process of resolving disputes in a public court
system according to procedures and institutions established by the state.”); see also Gordon,
supra note 139, at 6; KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1.
250 See Resnik, Whither or Whether Adjudication, supra note 218, at 1124 (“One form is courtbased ADR, which creates a ‘new’ civil procedure. Techniques such as mediation, arbitration,
and settlement conferences, once termed ‘extrajudicial,’ have become regular features of civil
process.”) (emphasis added).
251 See COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES AND MEDIATION PROCEDURES (AM. ARB. ASS’N.
2013).
252 A full discussion of the role of private contract in arbitration is beyond the scope of this
Article. For a thoughtful discussion of the hostility and enthusiasm for private arbitration, see
Bookman, supra note 249.
253 See id. at 1165-73 (comparing the aspects and risks of arbitration and litigation).
254 See AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., supra note 248, at 6-7 (discussing the overall lack of diversity in
arbitrator selection); see also KESSLER, Inventing American Exceptionalism, supra note 1, at
203, 284.
255 See AM. ASS’N FOR JUST., supra note 248 (discussing an employment discrimination case
against Tesla by a Black employee who alleged he suffered “at least a dozen instances of racial
slurs and threats, including video of co-workers threatening him while using the n-word.”).
Tesla took the case to arbitration and a white arbitrator ruled that the slurs were not racist, thus
not evidence of discrimination, but “were consistent with lyrics and images commonly found in
rap songs.” The Article also notes the gender disparity in arbitrator availability and how that
disparity is of particular concern in sexual harassment cases. Id.
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However unlikely it may seem, Major League Baseball (MLB)
is an example of how arbitration can be used effectively in a workplace
dispute. First of all, despite all media indications to the contrary,
professional sports teams are workplaces, and the people involved in
those enterprises come to work, wear uniforms, and seek fair salaries
and equitable working environments.256 In baseball, the core employee
issue is often compensation, and, to its credit, Major League Baseball
devised its own system of arbitration to manage player compensation
controversies.257 Like most arbitrations, the matter in controversy is
heard by a panel of three arbitrators, all of whom who possess the
relevant expertise.258
The important difference is the process. Baseball salary
arbitrations involve the panel selecting between two, and only two,
options—the salary proposed by the player or the salary proposed by the
team.259 There is no third option and no hybrid options.260 Both sides
make their pitch for the proposed salary, and the arbitrators decide.261
The process is time structured with one hour allotted to each side, then
thirty minutes per side for rebuttal.262 The player argues first, trying to
convince the arbitrators to adopt their salary proposal based on the
comparable data regarding salaries of other similar players.263 The team
follows with its argument, which is also based on comparable data
evidence.264 The entire process, including rebuttals, is typically
concluded within one half day, and the panel renders its decision within
twenty-four hours.265 The arbitrators’ decision is final, and the parties
understand the process and the resolution.266 When players hit the field

256 See Ross E. Davies, Along Comes the Players Association: The Roots and Rise of Organized
Labor in Major League Baseball, 16 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 321, 322-46 (2013)
(chronicling the history of major league baseball players as a labor force).
257 See Bibek Das, Salary Arbitration and the Effects on Major League Baseball and Baseball
Players, 1 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 55-56 (2003); see also Andrew J.
Wronski, The Unique Game of Baseball Arbitration, 48 LITIGATION 29, 29.
258 See Wronski, supra note 257 at 29.
259 Id.
260 See Das, supra note 257, at 56-57 (“The arbitrator must chose [sic] either the amount given
by the owner or the amount given by the player.”).
261 See Wronski, supra note 257, at 29.
262 Id.
263 Id.
264 Id.; see also Das, supra note 257, at 57 (noting criteria for salary arbitration).
265 See Wronski, supra note 257, at 29.
266 Id.
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after a salary arbitration, the controversy is over for the affected player
and for the others on the team.267
In order for arbitration to serve as an adequate substitute for
adversarial litigation, the arbitration rules must allow for a different, not
merely substituted, process.268 There is no special magic in replacing
judges and juries with arbitrators if the process remains adversarial at
its core, leaving the parties to assume the roles of winners and losers.269
The MLB salary arbitration system allows the controversy to be
resolved with the team culturally intact in part because the system values
the team over the individual player.270 The suggestion here is that all
workplace litigation should value the equitable function of the
workplace over the individual worker, thus reducing the need for
workplace litigation focused on individual harm and litigation success.
CONCLUSION
Imagine for a moment how workplace claims would be impacted
if plaintiff-employees could work with the defendant-employer to create
a better work environment such that the plaintiff-employee could accept
a remedy that allowed them to return to a reformed workplace. This
Article argues that a more progressive approach to resolving workplace
controversies, one which allows the parties to work towards a better
overall understanding of the actual workplace culture, would allow for
the reconciliation of competing social truths in the workplace and the
overall improvement of workplace culture to the benefit of all.
Compare a plaintiff-employee’s successful outcome in nonadversarial dispute resolution to a plaintiff-employee’s victory against
a defendant-employer through adversarial litigation. If the employee
can return to an improved workplace, the social outcome benefits all.
Whereas in cases when the employee wins after an adversarial contest,
the case outcome is often attributed to factors such as the better lawyer,
the biased judge, the few “bad apples” at work, or the overall failure of
267 See id. at 31 (discussing how the salary arbitration format changes litigation strategy—there
is no incentive for lawyers to argue alternative theories and “hedge their bets” as the arbitration
panel has no discretion to find a middle ground).
268 See Das, supra note 257, at 57-58. Das argues the “final offer format” has drawbacks that
can affect the relationship between the player and the team. For example, if the owners degrade
the player to justify a lower salary award, the player/team relationship can be adversely
impacted. Das notes, however, that many owner representatives will hold back degrading
information to avoid alienating a player who will return to the team. Id.
269 See id.
270 Id. (noting that the final offer format forces both sides to give a reasonable offer to avoid
lingering controversies that can inhibit the player and the team).
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the jury system. If workplace social truths are challenged in a case-bycase adversarial manner the underlying sources of those workplace
truths are ignored, thus not improved. Furthermore, if the employer
prevails, the workplace culture is validated by the litigation process,
thus obviating any need for cultural change.
Civil litigation is, at its core, shortsighted. The system is not
designed to accomplish more than the resolution of the matter at hand,
and the parties, and their lawyers, are obligated to follow the rules of
the game. However, understanding the limitations of the system creates
opportunities for change. In times of increased cultural awareness,
lawyers should be asking the important questions regarding litigation
structures and who they benefit, understanding that litigation structures
which allow for cultural understanding can motivate cultural change.

